

Top Secret



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DIA review(s) completed.

24 NOV 1980

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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY TO THE DCI FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Draft DCI ADP Support to Imagery Task Team (DASITT)  
Report dated June 1980 (U)

Reference: DASITT memo dated 23 June 1980, subject: Draft of the  
Imagery Data Processing Support Study.

1. (C) A review of the subject report has been accomplished by DIA, the Military Services and U&S Commands. The Staff is to be commended for surfacing a critical resource problem. However, there are significant concerns regarding the proposed alternative to resolve the technical support issues.

2. (C) There is agreement with the report concerning the impact of the anticipated increase in imagery data and the need for additional fiscal support for imagery ADP-T systems. However, we disagree with the recommendation for near total replacement of the current DoD imagery management and exploitation support systems, also with the proposed modifications to the Defense intelligence community's imagery support functions. These recommendations are not acceptable for the following reasons:

a. (U) The purpose of these systems is to support the wartime missions and military exigencies. They should be evaluated accordingly, not on their ability to support the peacetime intelligence community.

b. (C) A number of the DoD systems affected by the DASITT alternatives support functions other than imagery. Implementation of the DASITT alternatives provide only for imagery functions. The thrust of DASITT recommendations is not compatible with DODIIS modernization efforts to develop broader and more efficient resource-sharing systems.

c. (C) DoD imagery support systems must accommodate theater imagery collection systems and functions in addition to the national collection systems. Implementation of DASITT recommended alternatives would be significantly more costly if expanded/modified to meet the collection management and exploitation needs of conventional theater collection platforms.

d. (U) The proposed DASITT alternatives do not provide for the planned redundancy and survivability required of DoD systems. The proposals gravitate rapidly to a single system concept leaving no capability for backup processing either at remote sites or in the Washington area.

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Cy 1 of 3

Downgrade to CONFIDENTIAL upon removal  
of enclosures/codeword/caveat.

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SPC is our  
Basis for  
current plans  
They are  
SAC's


e. (C) The draft report does not provide the supporting empirical data and analysis to justify recommending replacement of the current DoD imagery support systems. Assumptions that existing DIA systems have reached saturation and cannot be expanded in a cost/effective manner are invalid. Similarly, assumptions regarding the time and cost needed to modularize systems currently being procured are considered to be significantly underestimated.

3. (C) As stated earlier, the Defense intelligence community is in agreement with the DASITT report concerning the impact of the anticipated increase in imagery data and the need for additional fiscal support for imagery ADP-T systems outside of guidance. However, approaches are being addressed which cause less organizational, functional, technical and fiscal risk while still adequately supporting valid DoD mission requirements. The recently submitted DIA and Air Force unranked packages reflect our initial assessments. Through the implementation of DODIIS architecture and with approved fiscal support of the magnitude reflected in those packages, an adequate start can be made towards meeting the intent and objectives of the report.

4. (U) Attached at enclosures are additional detailed substantive comments.


2 Enclosures

1. Topics of paramount concern(s)
2. Comments on items requiring further justification(TS/TK)



EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR.  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

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This enclosure provides comments on topics which recur throughout the report or specific areas which are of paramount concern.

1. (C) A major claim throughout the report is that collection managers require better access to the information contained in CAMS. DIA concurs; however, DIA does not concur that the provision of CAMS terminals and direct access to that system is necessarily the only, or best, alternative. An improved CAMS-AIRES interface, along with improved communications between AIRES and theater centers, could provide the required services while not requiring the installation of unique new hardware. The report's treatment of this topic is also inconsistent in that both direct (dedicated) communications circuits and common user systems are specified for the CAMS accesses.

2. (S) Closely related to the previous topic, Alternatives 2, 3 and 4 would exacerbate current problems in the training and maintaining of user terminals in the field. Those alternatives propose overall architectures which would require the proliferation of unique, multiple hardware. Several organizations, including SAC and the U&S Commands, would require at least three types of terminals due to the concentration of essential functions in three systems (NDS, CAMS, AIRES). The deliberate design of ADP architecture with such a diversity is in direct opposition to principles espoused in the DODIIS Master Plan and other long range ADP planning documents.

3. (S) With regard to access to national data bases, planned improvements to the AIRES system will accommodate the capability recommended in the DASITT report. Development is underway to provide the U&S Commands and S&T Centers, if they so choose, with an interactive access

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Enclosure 1

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to the AIRES system. Efforts are also underway to provide an improved interface between CAMS and AIRES to support collection tasking and feedback. (Thereby negating the need for CAMS terminals at the Commands).

4. (S) While the proposal for the establishment of an interagency, centralized softcopy center has merit, the utility of only initially evaluating IDEX is of concern. Initial evaluation and study of other less expensive softcopy systems leads us to believe that such a center should initially contain several systems. Thus, less expensive systems with more limited capabilities could be fielded by the mid 80's. It is believed that such a system could accommodate most of the requirements of field activities at considerably less cost.

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This enclosure provides comments on specific items in the report which are considered to be inaccurate or lacking of supporting justification.

*2nd ed*

Page 1, last paragraph: (U) The statement is made that all but one ADP system are at or near saturation, however, no data to support this assertion is provided. In at least the case of AIRES, this is not correct. Average response times are consistently less than 10 seconds. Upgrades currently in progress will provide additional capability to support U&S Commands' and Services' access. Recommend data be provided or cited to support its assertion.

Page 2, last line: (U) After "characteristics" add "and employment concepts." The DoD Program Managers have not been provided with detailed information on the employment of these new systems.

*✓✓✓✓✓*

Page 4, first line: (U) The statement that the plan addresses present network inadequacies is not entirely true. The network inadequacies are addressed but the term network as used in this report actually means the composite of the five systems studied. Little network analysis exists anywhere in the report.

*referred*

Page 4, last sentence on page: (U) This is not a correct assertion. The most significant proposals are those that would change functions in a way that is not constant with current DoD policy.

*✓✓✓✓✓*

Page 5, second paragraph: (U) The term ADP-T in the context of this report is somewhat a misnomer. In fact, all that is addressed is ADP. Recommend this fact be addressed.

Page 20, first paragraph: (TS/TK) The discussion concerning the target deck ignores the fact that AIRES registers twice the national deck at present. Also, ignores that AIRES from its inception was a

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Enclosure 2

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comprehensive system, i.e., all AIF targets, all requirements and all IIR's from all producers. The increases in collection requirements and installations are not as traumatic for AIRES as CAMS/NDS. The report should reflect this conclusion.

*modified*

Page 22, first paragraph: (TS/TK) Although it is reasonable to postulate that the system described could occasionally be used to image ships in open ocean areas, the report implication that it could be used for "tracking the exact location..." is not valid. The satellite ephemeris and ship movements would virtually preclude "tracking." At best, this system might provide an identification of a ship already geolocated by other means. The "impact on data base size" would not be significant.

Page 24, first paragraph: (C) There is no supporting rationale or requirement for combining area coverage and intelligence content into a single data base.

*1/2*

Page 25: (S) With the advent of new imaging systems it is expected that the functions of these imagery interpreters will change significantly -- in other words, there will be a new way of doing business. Believe that the paragraph as written is misleading. See also page 26, last paragraph.

*2/2*

Page 26, first paragraph: (C) The problem of indexing information by subject is being addressed in SAFE. Recommend this be reflected in the report. In addition, DIA is planning enhanced NACDF and DBIDI files and this too should be reflected in the report.

Page 36, first paragraph: (C) The implication is made that support to EUCOM is deficient because PI reports from the 497th RTG are not available "on-line." In fact, EUCOM HQS receives important reports

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when they are produced, and the intelligence function of that HQS is such that access to large historical data bases is not required on a routine basis. In contrast, the mission of USAFE (mentioned also on the same page) is such that routine access to PI reports is required and a lack of on-line access may be a deficiency. Recommend the conclusion drawn from this functional misconception be corrected.

*indirect*  
Page 39, first paragraph: (S) It should be noted that the CAMS portion of the CAMS/AIRES interface has not been developed.

*noted*  
Page 40, last paragraph: (C) It should be noted that in the GDIP resources have been requested to insure continuous AIRES support. Thus, the impact of the new system will not be as serious as stated. Recommend changes to reflect this situation.

*noted*  
Page 43, last paragraph: (U) The DODIIS architecture calls for the concept of regional data bases interconnected by appropriate communication and supported by a common query language. Thus, the problem identified is being addressed and it should be so stated in the report.

*quantified added*  
Page 44, last sentence: (U) This presumption is not supported by the report. Recommend deletion unless additional rationale is presented.

*noted*  
Page 51, first full paragraph: (C) To appropriately evaluate alternatives, identification of risks for years subsequent to 1985 are required. By only evaluating the '85 risks, no consideration can be given for a phased upgrade/replacement which would or could be available in a later time frame. Recommend final report correct this oversight.

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*ignore d*  
Page 51, last sentence: (U) The expression "substantive intelligence gain" is not clear. Recommend definitive explanation be included.

*done*  
Page 55, after first line add: (S) "interface with DDS(ESD) for collection management and exploitation management." This initiative has not been recognized in the report and influence alternative selections.

*red*  
Page 61, AIRES: (C) Do not concur that AIRES cannot be upgraded. DIA analysis shows that the system can be upgraded.

*changed*  
Page 61, IDHS-80: (C) Recommend change to reflect fact that this system will be operational in 1985.

*notch*  
Page 62, CATIS: (C) Do not concur that CATIS cannot be upgraded. DIA analysis shows that the system can be upgraded.

*Wright*  
Page 64, second paragraph: (TS/TK) Do not concur with changing the functions supported by AIRES, CAMS and NDS. To convert AIRES to an analyst support system ignores the important investment in SAFE and its analyst support role. In fact, SAFE will probably reduce some of the AIRES current analyst support workload. Having NPIC and DIA interpreters assessing the same data base does not necessarily mean reducing duplicative imagery readouts. These readouts are normally dependent on organizational mission requirements. Recommend paragraph be rewritten to reflect the above comments.

*rewire d*  
Page 64, last paragraph: (U) No telecommunications systems are discussed. Recommend deletion of words "and telecommunications systems" or the inclusion of such systems.

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*Reviewed*  
Page 65, first paragraph: (S) CAMS does not control imagery dissemination. Recommend deletion of this line.

*is not up to par*  
Page 66, first paragraph: (S) No mention is made of national air-breathing collectors. How will they be managed? Are they to be included in CAMS? Recommend clarification.

*Reviewed*  
Page 67, IDHS-80: (U) Nonconcur with off-loading analyst support functions. The size of this workload at SAC could not be supported by a remote site.

*Reviewed*  
*not b/w*  
Page 69, last sentence: (U) Nonconcur with this conclusion, see first comment for page 64.

*Reviewed*  
Page 70, second paragraph: (S) Disagree with last sentence in paragraph. Current interface between NDS and AIRES permits timely access to NPIC readouts. Recommend deletion of this sentence.

*Reviewed*  
Page 81, first full paragraph: (C) Redirection of the IDHS-80 program to a modular design to support smaller processors is a high risk venture which cannot be supported.

*Reviewed*  
Page 90, first paragraph: (U) Recommend it be noted that the DODIIS architectural approach addresses common software development.

*Reviewed*  
Page 93, first paragraph: (U) All central software development for DoD must be consistent with the current standards being developed for DODIIS.

*Reviewed*  
Page 110: (U) Believe the risks for this alternative would be significantly reduced by extending the life of current systems and those under development prior to implementing this alternative. Recommend this idea be included in the final report.

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Page 147: (C) The single system dependency risks for alternatives 2, 3 and 4 are "high" because CAMS, NDS, and AIRES are all single systems with no alternate data bases for information survivability.

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Page 148: (C) The telecommunications risks for alternatives 2, 3, 4 and 5 are "high" because of the need for large volumes of interactive accesses to single systems via long-haul communications links. There are additional risks when foreign owned communications facilities are utilized in Europe.

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Page 151, lines 3, 4, 9, 10 and 11: (C) Recommend these lines be revised to remove claim that PACER/SYSTEM 70, AIRES and CATIS upgrades are "impossible" or that they have reached the "limits of their capabilities." These conclusions are invalid. DIA studies reflect the converse is true.

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~~In summaries~~  
Page 174, Recommendation 4: (C) DIA concurs in the development and use of a standard mensuration system wherever economically feasible, and will encourage the remaining S&T centers and other DoD organizations to consider the NPIC-developed system. DIA also concurs in principle with the use of remote terminals on the NPIC mensuration system, but only for organizations in the Washington, D.C. area.

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~~In summaries~~  
Page 175: (U) Recommendation - Acceleration of PACOM, EUCOM and LANTCOM imagery support capabilities has merit. However, within the constraints of the GDIP, additional funding to support this appears unlikely.

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*Summary*

Page 180, last paragraph: (U) It is the policy of the DODIIS community to foster ADP resource-sharing and with regard to LANTCOM and TAC-sharing a computer system, this option will be addressed. However, mission accomplishment may prove to be an overriding consideration, necessitating separate computer systems.

Page 182: (S) Proposal - The need for more ready access to the National Area Coverage File and the DoD Data Base of Imagery Derived Information has been recognized. Development of an on-line capability for these two files was proposed in the DIA unranked budget package.

Page 184: (S) Proposal - Imagery reporting standards for topical and periodic reporting need to be addressed. Recommend such a study include addressing the impact on DoD technical systems.

Page 185: (U) Standardization of reporting, data exchange, message protocols and common installation identification should also be addressed. Here, as above, consideration also needs to be given to DoD tactical systems.

Page 185: (S) Proposal - Agree that some effort needs to be undertaken to insure that the requirements for the reporting of vertical obstructions are properly clarified. However, do not believe this requires a major study effort.

Page 191: (U) Recommendation - Because of Congressional mandates, competitive computer procurement is a fact of life and the Defense Intelligence Community has embarked on an architecture which permits common software development with standardization of hardware a secondary consideration. No utility is seen in providing the DCI justification on sole source procurement of computer hardware. Do not concur with this recommendation.

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